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AN ECONOMIC MODEL COSTING "EARLY OFFERS"
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM: TRADING
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR PROMPT
PAYMENT OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES
JEFFREY O'CONNELL,** JEREMY KIDD"* & EVAN STEPHENSON""
I. A NON-TECHNICAL PRESENTATION
This first section, in contrast to Parts II-VI, presents the Article's thesis in
non-technical terms for the general reader.
A. The Problem
In personal injury cases, the current system of tort liability has long been
unworkable, especially because the insured event is extremely complex.' Under
the current system, a plaintiff must prove two difficult elements: the defendant's
fault and the economic value of noneconomic damages, mostly pain and
suffering.2 In medical malpractice cases, determining not only the value of pain
and suffering, but particularly fault, is an especially complex process.3 As a
result, the system is fraught with uncertainties, which in turn cause excessive
costs and delay for both sides.4 In the end, we do not have a sensible insurance
system that results in prompt payment to needy victims. Rather, we have a
system that results in prolonged, expensive fights over whether claimants are
deserving.5 This system operates to the great detriment of both patients and
health care professionals.
B. A Solution
A previously published description of the reform proposed herein reads as
follows:
As a cure for much of this sad tale, [we focus on a proposed] statute which

gives a defendant... an incentive to make an "early offer," defined as a sum
large enough to recompense injured victims for their net economic losses,
including attorneys' fees. If such an early offer is tendered, the injured victim
will normally forfeit the opportunity in a negligence action of winning full
common-law damages for both economic and noneconomic damages at
trial....

* Prepared for the New Mexico Law Review's Symposium on February 19, 2005, at the University of
New Mexico School of Law.
** Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A., Dartmouth College, 1951; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1954.
*
B.A., Utah State University, 1998; Ph.D. candidate, Utah State University, 2005.
SB.A., George Mason University, 2002; J.D. expected, University of Virginia Law School, 2005.
1. See generally Jeffrey O'Connell, StatutoryAuthorization of Nonpayment of Noneconomic Damages
as Leverage for Prompt Payment of Economic Damages in PersonalInjury Cases, 71 TENN. L. REV. 191
(2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BREAKING THE LITIGATION HABIT: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
FOR LEGAL REFORM 5-14 (2000), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/reportlegal.pdf [hereinafter
CED].
4. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 192.
5. Id.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 35

Under this system, a defendant.. .has the option-not the obligation-to
offer the claimant, within 180 days after a claim is filed, periodic payment of
the claimant's net economic losses as they accrue. Economic losses under an
early offer statute must cover medical expenses, including rehabilitation, plus
lost wages, to the extent that all such costs are not already covered by
collateral sources [that is, other insurance], plus attorney's fees.[6 ] Therefore,
a defendant cannot make a lesser or "low ball" offer and still earn the
advantage of foreclosing a full-scale tort claim. If the defendant decides not
to make an early offer, the injured victim can proceed with a normal tort
claim for both economic and noneconomic damages. Alternatively, if the
claimant declines the early offer in favor of litigation, (1) the standard of
[misconduct is raised], allowing payment only where "wanton misconduct" is
proven; and (2) the standard of proof is [also] raised, requiring proof of such
misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt....Because of the uncertainty and cost
of determining both liability and noneconomic damages under present tort
law, it is likely that defendants in.. .medical malpractice.. .cases will
promptly make early offers in many claims, even when liability is unclear.
[William Ginsburg,] [a] leading malpractice defense lawyer has predicted
that if [an early offers statute] were in effect, he would advise making the
defined early offer in 200 of the 250 cases that his large [inter-state offices
were] then litigating.
The opposing fear of potential higher costs under this early offers scheme
is avoided in that no defendants need make an offer if they would not do so
without this [statute]. Thus, defendants will make an offer only when it
makes economic sense for them to do so. Moreover, this statute would not
disadvantage victims as a class. [True, injury] victims would lose their
recourse to full-blown tort litigation-with all its uncertainty, delays, and
transaction-costs-[but] only when they are guaranteed prompt payment of
their actual economic losses, plus attorney's fees.
Thus, the uncertainty of determining both liability and damages for
noneconomic damages is the key to understanding the malfunctioning of tort
law-and to framing a [balanced] solution. Because the existence of pain and
suffering is indeterminate and highly volatile, under [an early offer] system
the fear of an award of pain and suffering damages can serve (1) to deter
[providers of medical] services from exposing themselves to liability for such
damages by indulging in anything close to [what could be seen by a jury as
serious] misconduct and (2) as an incentive to make early offers of economic
losses, which will provide prompt compensation to victims for many more
(admittedly not all) of the inevitable injuries that accompany the delivery of
[medical] services in an advanced technological society.
Because personal injury claims-alone among all other damage claimsroutinely entail damages for both economic and noneconomic losses,
defendants are uniquely positioned not only to make, but also to enforce,
socially attractive settlements under the [early offers] system. As stated
above, this system [encourages] a claimant's acceptance of a defendant's
prompt offer of payment of the claimant's net economic losses in return for a
waiver of noneconomic damages, along with statutory sanctions that impose
6. The attorney's fees are assumed to be ten percent of the present value of the early offer. Payment of
attorneys' fees by defendants, in addition to net economic losses, is necessary to reimburse the victim's
economic losses, assuming no damages for pain and suffering are to be paid.

Spring 2005]

EARLY OFFERS

[both that higher] standard of [misconduct] and [that] higher burden of proof
if the offer is refused. In non-personal injury claims, in which only economic
damages are at stake, no such equitable means are available to sanction a
claimant who refuses to accept an offer of only a portion of the total damages
claimed.
Note that it is not feasible to provide a full-scale no-fault solution for
[medical services] because of the difficulty of defining the "no-fault insured
event" for injuries that arise from... medical treatment .... Under no-fault auto
insurance policies, an accident victim is compensated for an injury arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Under workers'
compensation laws, an industrial accident victim is compensated for an injury
arising out of, and in the course of, employment. [It is not feasible, however,]
to force all health care providers to pay patients for any and all injuries
arising in the course of medical treatment. After all, it is often impossible to
determine whether a patient was injured by the treatment rendered or whether
the adverse condition after treatment was just a normal extension of the
condition which prompted treatment in the first place. A health care provider
certainly could not be expected to pay every patient whose condition worsens
after treatment .... Because such a comprehensive no-fault solution is
unworkable, and therefore unavailable, for... [medical accidental injuries,] the
proposed [early offers system] is the most-and perhaps the only-workable,
[economical,] equitable, and simplifying solution.
Such a [statute] well serves the goals of both internalization and
compensation of losses in comparison to present tort law, and thus results in
(1) appropriate deterrence; (2) less overdeterrence; (3) lower insurance costs;
(4) less delay in the payment of losses; [(5) more payment of essential
losses;] and (6) lower transaction costs [read legal fees on both sides]. 7
7. O'Connell, supra note I, at 193-97. Professor O'Connell originally set forth the idea of early offers
in Offers That Can 't Be Refused: Foreclosureof PersonalInjury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of
Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 589 (1982). See also CED, supra note 3, at 17-22;
Henson Moore & Jeffrey O'Connell, ForeclosingMedical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic
Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267 (1984). For more thorough discussion of early offers, see Jeffrey O'Connell &
Patrick B. Bryan, More Hippocrates,Less Hypocrisy: "Early Offers " as a Means ofImplementing the Institute
of Medicine's Recommendations on MalpracticeLaws, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 23, 44-51 (2000-2001), and Jeffrey
O'Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law,
78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 865-67 (1999). As an example of one federal bill that applies the early offers plan in the
medical malpractice area, see 131 CoNG. REc. 36,870-76 (1985) (presenting and discussing the proposed
Medical Offer and Recovery Act). For more statutory drafts of legislation incorporating the early offer idea, see
S. 1861, 104th Cong. § 101 (1996); H.R. 3084, 99th Cong. § 2 (1985); H.B. 5700, 174th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess.
(Mass. 1986). Regarding the way punitive damages interact with pain and suffering damages in the context of
an early offer proposal, see Jeffrey O'Connell, Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault & Quasi-CriminalLiability,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 885-86 (1992).
For support for the proposition that a no-fault liability system would be unworkable in the medical
malpractice area, see PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 23-24 (1993) (noting that no simple method can separate negligent
medical outcomes from non-negligent outcomes). See also id. at 55 (noting that eighteen percent of a Harvard
study's after-the-fact determinations that health care provider negligence had occurred were "close-call cases").
Finally, in analyzing this or any other tort reform, it should be noted that evidence as to the deterrent
effects of tort litigation, at least in the medical malpractice context, is inconclusive. See Michelle M. Mello &
Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidencefor MalpracticeReform, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1595, 1598 (2002) ("We do find some limited evidence of deterrence, but conclude that overall the
evidence is thin."); WEILER ET AL., supra, at 75 ("Malpractice litigation appears, then, to be sending as
confusing a signal as would our traffic laws if the police regularly gave out more tickets to drivers who go
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C. How an Early Offers Statute Will Be More Effective Than Other Proposed
Reforms in Encouraginga Healthy Settlement Processfor Claimants and
Defendants
According to Patricia Danzon, "[t]he economic criterion for evaluating a
proposed [medical malpractice] reform is thus, Is it likely to... improve the
efficiency of deterrence and compensation, recognizing that the practical choice
is between imperfect alternatives?" 8 The most common tort reform proposalsincluding damage caps, changes in the collateral source rule, and regulation of
claimants' attorney contingent fees-lack an early offers law's ability to structure
and encourage early and adequate pretrial settlement. As Danzon notes in the
medical malpractice context, "most actual tort reform proposals aim primarily to
reduce measurable claim costs and liability insurance premiums or budgetary
costs to health care providers. This budget focus is likely to result, at best, in
simply shifting costs from medical providers to patients and taxpayers." 9
Another reason for preferring an early offers law to other tort reforms is that
the burden of the latter's reductions falls more on the worst injured or most
legitimate tort victims (whom these reforms presumably do not intend to harm)
than on claimants' lawyers' fees and less-than-valid claims (which these reforms
do clearly intend to affect). An early offers law is superior to these other
proposals because it avoids unintentionally disadvantaging the most needy, and
arguably legitimate, claimants.
D. Early Offers Laws Will Avoid BurdeningHealth Care Providersand
Claimants,EspeciallyLegitimate Needy Claimants
Early offers statutes will reduce litigation-induced waste by causing more
cases to be resolved much earlier. Early offers laws will also enhance the tort
compensation mechanism by conditioning advantages offered to defendants on
the extension of a binding offer to pay an adequate sum: claimants'
uncompensated economic losses. Since early offers take claims out of the current
system only after the claimant is assured of adequate payment, the worst-injured
claimants, who have the most need of prompt and significant payment, will not
be short-changed as a group by an early offers statute. Finally, the positions of
insurance companies and other defendants cannot be much worsened by early
through green lights than to those who go through red lights."). See also id.at 113, which states:
A special problem [with believing that tort litigation deters medical malpractice].. .is the low
probability that any one negligent injury.. .will produce a tort claim....To the extent that
injured victims systematically underutilize their tort rights, there is a corresponding reduction
in actors' incentives to adopt socially optimal precautions against such injuries.
But see id.
at 129 (noting that there is statistically insignificant evidence that the more malpractice suits brought
against doctors in a particular hospital, the fewer the number of negligent medical injuries that will be suffered
by patients in that hospital); id at 133; infra note 25 and accompanying text (observing that excessive litigation
reduces the quality of medical care). See generally HARV. MED. PRACTICE STUDY GROUP, PATIENTS, DOCTORS,
AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK

(1990).
8. Patricia M. Danzon, Liabilityfor Medical Malpractice, in lB HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
1339, 1371 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). Danzon also mentions reduction in
deadweight losses, an issue we address below in Part VI.A.
9. Id.
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offers.' o Even if they conclude that early offers are making them worse off, they
can simply stop making early offers and return to the current system.
E. Early Offers Can Reduce the Differences Between Claimants and Defendants
Recall that under an early offers law, every dispute begins in the current
system. Within 180 days of a claim, the defendant insurance company may make
an early offer, defined in the statute to include all of the claimant's
uncompensated economic loss as it accrues. If the defendant insurance company
makes an early offer and the claimant rejects the offer, the standard of liability in
the claimant's upcoming tort action changes from negligence to, in effect,
criminal misconduct (termed "quasi-criminal"), and the burden of proof
heightens from "more likely than not" to "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Assuming that the claimant was not injured by quasi-criminal misconduct,
after an early offer is made, the claimant's probability of winning a full-scale tort
suit diminishes drastically and the expected value of the tort claim drops with it.
How steeply does the claim's expected value decline? The example below
creates a hypothetical early offer scenario that quantifies this point and illustrates
the types of trade-offs expected by early offers where there is an impasse
between claimants and defendants.
For both the early offer and post-early-offer scenarios, our model adjusts
future jury awards to their net expected present value. The phrase "net expected
present value" bundles together four adjustments of nominal future jury awards.
These four adjustments account for: (1) probability in outcome; (2) timing of
outcome, and specifically a positive rate of time preference by individual actors;
(3) the claimant's lawyer's contingent fee; and (4) other litigation-induced costs.
Together, these adjustments return a figure for the value claimants should attach
to their claims. A future nominal jury award must first be adjusted twice for
probability: once for the probability that the jury will find the defendant liable,
and again for the probability of various damage awards. We conflate these two
adjustments into one weighted average probability of a damage verdict.
Example 1. Claimant P files a claim against Defendant D. If the claim is not
settled, a suit is expected to be filed within a few months and continue for the
typical time from injury to payment, three years." P estimates the probability that
D will be found liable at 85.0% (line IA, Table 1 below). But D is much more
optimistic about its chances. D's estimate of this probability is one-half of P's
estimate, or initially 42.5% (line IB, Table 1). D also estimates the damages
likely to be awarded in case of liability as being significantly lower than P
does--specifically estimating damages at 80% of P's estimate (lines 2, 4, 6
A&B, Table 1). P and D both adjust their respective expected payoff/payout
estimates for the cost of hiring lawyers and adjust for time spent using the same
inflation-adjusted annual discount rate at 2% (lines 14 A&B, Table 1).12 P's
10. Interview with William Ginsburg, Esq., in Durham, N.C. (Apr. 1986).
11. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 7, at 5 ("In the nation as a whole, the median time from injury to
claim is 13 months, and from claim to payment 23 months, for a total of three years.").
12. D's discount rate applies only to the weighted average expected judgment, not to D's total expected
direct trial costs, because D's costs are not a lump sum at the end of the trial. For simplicity, we assume that all
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minimum acceptance or reservation price of about $400,000 (408.50, line 15A,
Table 1) is higher than D's maximum paying (or reservation) price of about
$280,000 (279.78, line 15B, Table 1), as also described in Table 1 below.' 3 The
parties fail to bargain out a settlement because their respective prices are out of
range of each other.
Table 1: Net Present Expected Value of Example 1 Tort Claim in the Current System

Trial Amounts/Probabilities
1. Probability of Liability
2. Expected Judgment 1
3. Probability of Judgment 1
4. Expected Judgment 2
5. Probability of Judgment 2
6. Expected Judgment 3
7. Probability of Judgment 3
8. Weighted Avg. Expected Judgment
Total Expected Direct Trial Costs
9. P1. (cont. fee, 33%); Def. (fixed rate)
10. Probability Claimant Will Sue
11. Expected Litigation Costs
Adjustments for the Value of Time
12. Net Expected Judgment
13. Time Until Judgment (years)
14. Discount Rate (i-adjusted)
15. Real Net Present Value of Exp. Judgment

Current System (pre-early offer)
(dollars in thousands)
B
A
Defendant's Mind
Plaintiff's Mind
85.0%
42.5%
$
(800.00)
$
1,000.00
10.0%
10.0%
$
(640.00)
$
800.00
80.0%
80.0%
$
(200.00)
$
250.00
10.0%
10.0%
$
(260.10)
$
650.25
$
$

(216.75)
100.0%
(216.75)
433.50
3.00
0.02
408.50

$
$

$

(34.68)
100.0%
(34.68)
(294.78)
3.00
0.02
(279.78)

Assume an early offers statute is in effect. Within the statute's prescribed
period, D makes an early offer to pay P's uncompensated economic loss as it
accrues. The present value of this offer, as noted in Table 2, below, is estimated
at about $175,000 (173.40, line IA, Table 2), versus D's last offer in tort of about
$280,000 (279.78, line 15B, Table 1). As also set forth in Table 2, after D makes
the early offer of about $175,000 (plus 10% for the claimant's lawyer),' 4 P's

of D's court costs are paid up front, with no discounting. Discounting D's total expected direct trial costs would
only make D and P less likely to settle, because such discounting would reduce the real net present value of the
expected judgment in D's mind, thus making D's maximum price furtherbelow P's minimum price.
13. For the derivation of the defense attorney's fee, see Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of
Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WAsH. U. L.Q. 653, 691 (2003)
("[C]ontingency-fee plaintiff lawyers and hourly rate defense lawyers devote roughly equal amounts of time to
the same tort cases.... [C]ontingency-fee lawyers' effective hourly rates of return in auto accident cases are
approximately two-and-one-half times that of (hourly rate) defense lawyers."). Thus, if the defense attorneys
value the claimant's suit at $260,100 (260.10, line 8B, Table 2), and expect the claimant's attorney to receive
one third, or $86,700, they should expect at least $34,680 (or $86,700/2.5). Cf. WEILER ET AL., supra note 7, at
17 ("Malpractice insurers in New York now spend an average of well over $10,000 to defend every malpractice
claim....").
14. This estimate for the early offer was reached by dividing the average weighted expected value by 2.5
to factor out noneconomic damages (which generally are a multiple of economic damages). This figure was
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estimate of the probability that D will be found liable at trial has decreased by
over 80% (line 15A, Table 2) to a mere 2% (line 2A, Table 2). 15 This is a result
of the post-early-offer heightened standard of both misconduct and burden of
proof. The value P attaches to the claim is then so low that no rational lawyer
would work on it contingently. If P hired an hourly lawyer equivalent to D's to
go forward with trial under the higher standard of liability and burden of proof, P
would expect a loss from suit (see line 14A, Table 2).
Table 2: Effect of a Hypothetical Early Offer on the Value of Table 1 Claim
Early Offer System (post-offer)

(dollars in thousands)
1. Estimated Value of the Early Offer
Trial Amounts/Probabilities
2. Probability of Liability
3. Expected Judgment 1
4. Probability of Judgment 1
5. Expected Judgment 2
6. Probability of Judgment 2
7. Expected Judgment 3
8. Probability of Judgment 3
9. Weighted Avg. Expected Judgment
Total Expected Direct Trial Costs
10. Pl. (fixed rate); Def. (fixed rate)
Adjustments for the Value of Time
11. Time Until Judgment (years)
12. Discount Rate (i-adjusted)
13. Present Value of Exp. Judgment
14. Real Net Present Value of Exp. Judgment
Significant Changes from Table 1
15. Reduction in Probability of Liability
16. Change in R.Net Present Value of Exp.
Judgment

A
Plaintiff's Mind
$
173.40

$
$
$
$

$

2.0%
1,000.00
10.0%
800.00
80.0%
250.00
10.0%
15.30

B
Defendant's Mind
(190.74)
$
1.0%

$

(800.00)

$

33.3%
(640.00)

$

(200.00)

33.0%
33.3%

$

(5.47)

(34.68)

(34.68)

3.00

3.00
0.02
(5.15)

0.02
14.42
(20.26)

(39.83)

83.0%
(428.76)

41.5%
239.95

Note: The Change in Real Net Present Value of the Expected Judgment, listed above in Table 2, is found by
subtracting the Table 2 Real Net Present Value of the Expected Judgment from the same figure for Table 1.
Precisely: (20.26) [line 14A, Table 2] - 408.50 [line 15A, Table 1]= (428.76) [line 16A, Table 2]. And, for
the defense: (39.83) [line 14B, Table 2] - (279.78) [line 15B, Table 1]= 239.95 [line 16B, Table 2].

then conservatively adjusted downward by one third; the example assumes that P's own insurance covers one
third of compensatory damages.
15. In our example, the claimant's post-early-offer belief in a 2% likelihood of victory on the issue of
liability is extremely optimistic. In the current system, data indicates that a tiny fraction of 1% (0.16%, to be
precise) of total medical malpractice cases brought to trial result in punitive damage awards against defendants.
The type of egregious behavior that calls for punitive damages is roughly equivalent to gross negligence, but
after a statutory early offer has been made and the claimant rejects the offer, the claimant must satisfy the higher
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Thus, the percentage of cases resulting in post-early-offer awards
would likely be lower than the percentage awarding punitive damages--or less than 0.16%. NICHOLAS M. PACE
ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

MICRA 60 & n.6 (2004) ("[T]he effective rate of punitive awards
for all medical malpractice cases that go to a jury is 0.16 percent.").

TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER
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Table 2 above does not show the effect of an early offer on the variance of
expected awards, that is, awards as a group. Figure 1 below illustrates this aspect
of early offers graphically. Figure 1, not limited to the specific case represented
by Tables 1 and 2, does assume a normal distribution of possible damage awards
as a group. The weighted average of all possible jury awards in Figure 1 returns a
single payoff for claimants as a group, adjusted for the probability of recovery.
Figure 1: Early Offers' Effect on Distribution of Expected Jury Awards,
Versus Acceptance of Early Offers
100
acceptance of early offers

pre-early offers

40

•
0

am
Expected Quantity ofMoney Awarded ($)

In Figure 1, we assume this normal distribution of possible expected jury
awards as a group, before and after early offers. 16 Claimants' initial expected jury
awards are represented by the "pre-early-offers" curve. The expected reward
from early offers is in turn represented by the "acceptance of early offers" curve.
The acceptance of early offers curve differs from the pre-early-offers curve in
two ways: first, it has the shape of a spike, rather than a bell; second, the center
of the acceptance of early offers curve is located to the left of the center of the
pre-early-offers curve. The acceptance of early offers curve is shaped like a spike
because, if early offers are accepted, the amount of money to be paid is
statutorily set and therefore largely certain. The pre-early-offers curve is shaped
as a bell, instead of a spike, because the amounts to be paid are highly uncertain,
varying from little or nothing to the almost unlimited. The center of the
acceptance of early offers curve is located to the left of the pre-early-offers
curve's center on the horizontal axis because early offers will have a lower
expected payoff than regular lawsuits (see, for example, Tables I and 2 above).

16. We do not include here a distribution for post-early-offer expected jury awards, because, as shown in
Table 2 (line 14A), any value therefrom would on average be negative, given the rarity of success coupled with
transaction costs (lines A2, Ai0, Table 2).
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Put another way, Figure 1 illustrates that early offers provide claimants to
whom early offers are made with compensation with negligible variance 7
(illustrated by its spike shape) and hence little or no risk. Furthermore, the shaded
area of the pre-early-offers curve can be seen as representing the expected
payments foreclosed by the early offer-a chance in the current system to obtain
noneconomic damages and amounts already covered by collateral sources. The
unshaded area of the pre-early-offers curve roughly can be seen as representing
uncompensated economic loss. The acceptance of early offers curve represents
roughly the same level of uncompensated economic loss, but with negligible
variance and hence little or no risk.
To go back to the hypothetical examples of the individual case shown in
Tables 1 and 2, the early offer there reduces P's probability of winning any
award in that case by 83% (line 15A, Table 2). The probability in this example is
now only about 2% (lines A&B, Table 2), because it is difficult to prove gross
negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the net expected present
value of the judgment after an early offer is probably less than the cost of
litigating. Line 14A of Table 2 indicates that the post-offer tort claim has a
negative value of $20,260.
In light of the amounts in the parties' minds without an early offer regime
(lines 1-8, 15 A&B, Table 1), one might ask what P is getting that makes the
trade-off of a likely lesser amount from an early offer advantageous? P gains a
prompt net payment of a sum certain covering essential medical and wage losses
of $173,400 (line IA, Table 2; plus 10% for attorney's fee for a total value of
$190,740, line 1B, Table 2), as opposed to three years of delay from a tort action,
with a projected risk of getting nothing of between 15% (in the claimant's mind)
and 57.5% (in the defendant's mind) (Lines IA and 1B, Table 1; 100 - 42.5 =
57.5), plus a projected variance of damages if and when any are awarded (lines
1-8, 15 A&B, Table 1). The acceptance of early offers spike in Figure 1
illustrates the reduction in risk (admittedly along with the likelihood of lesser
payment). A risky dollar is worth much less than a dollarwithout risk, especially
for the seriously injured. As emphasized above, the claimant in Table 2 has
received an early offer-binding guarantee of about $175,000 for uncompensated
losses as they accrue. The claimant will actually receive more or less depending
on the claimant's actual accrual of net economic loss. But the variance of the
acceptance of early offers curve is determined by the claimant's medical
progress, not by uncertainty surrounding potential jury deliberations. The
defendant assumes the risk associated with the claimant's medical fortunes. In
return for bearing little or no risk in litigation-a highly valuable benefit to
suffering and injured tort victims-a claimant in the example gives up the
amount already covered by insurance, as well as the possibility of pain and
suffering or punitive damages.
The risk-shifting mechanism of early offers, most importantly, shrinks the
effects of litigation-induced costs (that is, the "Wedge," and also as a corollary,

17. See infra text accompanying note 138. For information about how often early offers may be made,
see supranote 10 and accompanying text.
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the variance of possible awards)' 8 and decreases litigation-induced costs. This
concept of reducing the Wedge between the parties is absolutely crucial to the
success of early offers. Because rational claimants will not go to trial post-early
offer when the probability of prevailing is so low and when a socially adequate
and binding offer is open, many more cases will be settled quickly. In terms of
the Priest-Klein litigation model,' 9 the small post-early-offer expected outcome
of the trial is reasonably clear to both parties absent quasi-criminal misconduct:
the claimant will almost certainly lose. The early offer itself cannot be the subject
2°
of comparatively much controversy; its value is significantly pre-set. Judge
Richard Posner's insight that a wide range of possible bargaining outcomes
2
increases the likelihood of litigation comes into play. ' Early offers leave
relatively few realistic bargaining issues and thus reduce the likelihood of
litigation. Moreover, since early offers will encourage disputes to be resolved
parties avoid incurring a large portion of the
quickly, before trials can begin,
22
usual litigation-induced costs:
Trial expenses in addition to lawyers 'fees. There is much less need, for
example, to hire expert witnesses, generate reams of documents for
discovery, or perform extensive jury research and mock trials if the claim
has been settled within the first 180 days.
" Lost beneficial reliance. Since claimants and defendants will quickly
resolve cases except for the few involving quasi-criminal conduct, they
can better predict their liabilities and assets, plan for the future based on
those 2redictions, and enjoy the benefits of certain reliance on those
plans.
* Opportunity Cost of Trial. When an early offer has been made, claimants
and defendants need not allocate time and resources to protracted trials
and pretrial negotiations. Their most valuable opportunities in lieu of
trying a case are free for the taking. A claimant may use the time that
would have been spent on a trial much more advantageously, for example,
with family or working. For an insurance company or other defendant that
need not litigate, resources that would have been needlessly spent on
litigation will be freed for much better alternative uses.
* Peace of mind. Perhaps the greatest benefit to claimants and many
defendants from an early offer is the peace of mind that comes from no
longer having to face the emotional ordeal of a trial. At an earlier point, if
an early offer is tendered, claimants may rest assured that much of their
risk has been assumed by the defendant. Defendant insureds may also rest
at ease that they will not be dragged through ugly, prolonged litigation or

"

18. See infra text accompanying note 138. For a technical discussion on the beneficial role played by
early offers in the Wedge, compare Figure 2 at notes 96-98 and accompanying text with Figure 6 at notes 121127 and accompanying text.
19. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
20. Health and disability insurance, which the early offer mirrors, do not lead to all that much litigation
compared to litigating fault and the value of pain and suffering.
21.

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 523 (3d ed. 1986).

22. For a full discussion of the litigation-induced costs that can be avoided by an early offers statute, see
infra Part III.
23. On beneficial reliance, see generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises:An
Examination ofthe Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1266-76 (1980).
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otherwise publicly stigmatized. Just as important, with an early offer
already on the table, provisions under the early offers statute provide
defendants with an incentive to apologize and make information available
to claimants and others without fear of additional tort exposure. Greater
information about the causes of an injury and hearing some defendants
apologize can not only increase the parties' peace of mind but can make
for more frequent and prompter communication between health care
providers, leading to more effective safety programs. 24 Finally it is crucial
to note that a recent study by the Harvard School of Public Health
indicates that increased malpractice litigation under the tort system raises
the prospect not of better health care but of "lower quality and availability
of health [care]. ' '25

Finally, it should be noted that the efficacy of the early offer as indicated by
Figure 1 is not limited to the example in Tables 1 and 2. Rather, an early offer
will likely be made whenever the value of an early offer exceeds the defendant's
forecast of its liability in tort (based on the amount the defendant sets aside as a
reserve to pay the claim).
F. Claimantsand Defendants Are Inhibitedfrom Reaching the Early Offers
Result Through PretrialBargaining
If early offers benefit both claimants and defendants, why don't parties reach
the early offers result in the current system through pretrial bargaining? Given
the adversarial nature of bargaining over the many highly indeterminate variables
that make up malpractice litigation, if they made such offers in the current
system, defendants would fear sending a signal of weakness that would thereby6
encourage claimants to demand a much higher payment than originally sought7
Claimants and their counsel similarly dread that an early offer to settle for only
net economic loss will be seen as a lack of confidence in their case, risking
24. Early Offers would work to calm the animosities of the parties in an accident claim
rather than inflaming them, as the current litigation culture now does. It accomplishes this by
giving defendants a healthy incentive to promptly acknowledge any problems and even to
discuss what happened. Under the current adversarial tort regime, claimants rarely receive an
apology, admission of fault, or even an explanation of the adverse event. Many times a
simple apology or explanation by the defendant can assuage the emotions of an injured party
more effectively than a mammoth, long-delayed monetary award for pain and suffering
damages. Such open and candid discussions could provide the accident victim with another
form of valuable compensation often overlooked by the judicial system-peace of mind. In
fact, researchers report that feelings of forgiveness and compassion have been proclaimed as
therapeutic for accident victims because they reduce the anxiety and stress associated with
continuing anger and resentment. The Early Offers plan induces the parties to discuss what
happened rather than forcing them to engage in the combat of the current "blame game" of
tort litigation. In so doing, Early Offers thus promotes understanding, cooperation and swift
compensation rather than contentious, hostile, and dilatory legal proceedings [in addition to
the greater patient safety accompanying open and prompt exchanges between health care
providers after an adverse event.]
Jeffrey O'Connell, A ProposedRemedy for Mississippi's Medical MalpracticeMiseries, 22 Miss. C. L. REV. 1,
6-7 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
25. Michelle M. Mello et al., Caringfor Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: Physician Satisfaction and
Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 42, 51.
26. Jeffrey O'Connell & Evan Stephenson, Binding StatutoryEarly Offers by Defendants,Not Plaintiffs,
in PersonalInjury Suits, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 237 (2005).
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clearly inadequate payment.2 7 As a result, the parties today fail to settle promptly
for a claimant's net economic loss even when it would be seemingly advantageous to both.28
G. Why Binding Early Offers by Defendants Only
If an early offers system benefits both parties, why should it be the defendant
under early offers who has the power to bind the claimant? 29 Shouldn't claimants
have the power to make a binding early offer for payment of net economic loss
by the defendant? The simple answer is that claimants and their counsel would
"lack sufficient incentives to weed out frivolous or non-meritorious claims under
such a plan."30 If claimants had the power to unilaterally bind defendants, there
exploit the system with marginal claims or
would be
3 1 "a perverse incentive to
worse."
But defendants, as the entities making payment, when confronted with clearly
meritless claims will pay nothing and make no early offer-as they should.32 On
the other hand, when faced with potentially meritorious claims, defendants will
test whether "the statutorily defined early offer involves less exposure than a
fullscale tort suit with all its uncertainty and transaction costs. ' 33 Only defendants
have the appropriate incentives to "distinguish carefully between arguably
meritorious and clearly non-meritorious claims" in order to reduce costs by
promptly paying the required minimum benefits in suitable cases.34
H Why RedistributeIncome from Noneconomic Damages to Economic Damages
It is important to note that medical malpractice law is a form of state mandated
insurance. Anyone buying health care services must, in effect, pay for it. Thus,
the state is more justified in dictating not only its presence, but also its structure,
especially compared to insurance that, like life insurance, is purely voluntary.
When the state mandates workers' compensation coverage, it is redistributing
from those with good tort claims to those without. The justification for such a
transfer derives from the theory of diminishing marginal utility of money with its
concomitant use of the concept of "interpersonal utility comparisons."
The theory of diminishing marginal utility, when coupled with the proposition
of interpersonal utility comparisons, purports to justify spreading dollars more
widely among malpractice victims, rather than leaving heavy losses on some and
imparting relatively large amounts to others.35 Thus, the theory supports the early
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
For literature describing this problem, see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
See generally O'Connell & Stephenson, supra note 26.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 55-56 (1983).

Suppose, for example, that Bentham was correct in his belief that, lacking any real
knowledge of the responsiveness to income of different individuals' happiness, we should
assume that every one is pretty much alike in that respect [such that interpersonal utilities can
be readily calculated]. Then we need make only one additional, and as it happens plausible,
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offers proposal insofar as it transfers some dollars from those eligible for
payments for reimbursed economic loss and for noneconomic loss to those with
otherwise unreimbursed economic losses.
The theory of interpersonal utility comparisons is of course highly
controversial. Its critics rebut that policies designed to equalize incomes can be
said to increase public welfare. Thus, they argue that if people have different net
incomes, whether induced by accidents or not, a transfer that purports to equalize
income would not necessarily make things better than before the transfer: the
gain to the transferee is simply equal to the loss of the transferor. To take an
extreme example, even if by a transfer, A, a collector, loses his chance to buy a
fifth antique chair so that B, a quadriplegic, can buy a wheelchair, there is
supposedly no way to establish that A does not need his new chair just as acutely
as B needs his; that is, there can be no interpersonal utility comparison between
A and B. According to such a view, no scientific basis exists for concluding that
a redistribution of resources from A to B leads to net improvement.36 Similarly,
opponents of such use of interpersonal utility comparisons would presumably
argue that there is no justification for taking from those eligible for
reimbursement from collateral sources and payments for noneconomic losses to
pay for other accident victims' unreimbursed economic losses.
Nonetheless, the early offers plan is premised on the admittedly controversial
proposition that public welfare is advanced when insurance thus diverts dollars
from, say, payment of noneconomic losses to cover large amounts of serious
economic losses. Economic losses of substantial magnitude, if unreimbursed,
lead to lack of medical care, rehabilitation, and subsistence wages. Such losses
are in the realm of what Lord Keynes called "absolute" needs, "in the sense that
we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be. 3 7
Granted that defining "absolute" needs can be difficult and that redistribution of
income may be justified only for absolute needs, succor in the form of otherwise
unavailable payment for medical services and wage losses of the seriously
injured would seem clearly to fall within that category. If many victims of
morally neutral events, namely accidents, are now paid much more than their
economic losses, great or small, whereas other accident victims are paid much

assumption-that of the diminishing marginal utility of money income---to obtain a
utilitarian basis for a goal of equalizing incomes. For on these assumptions it is easily shown
that an equal distribution of income and wealth will produce more happiness than any other
distribution unless the costs of achieving and maintaining such a distribution equal or exceed
the benefits.
Id. We cite Posner to illustrate the basic principle discussed, while remaining mindful of his disdainful attitude
toward redistribution.
36. For an attack on programs based on the principle of the diminishing marginal utility of money, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 344-46 (2d ed. 1977). For a defense of such programs, see
PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425-29 (10th ed. 1976) and Julian L. Simon, Interpersonal Welfare
ComparisonsCan Be Made-andUsedfor RedistributionDecisions, 27 INT'L REV. SOC. SCI. 63 (1974).
37. John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilitiesfor Our Grandchildren(1930), in 9 THE COLLECTED
WRINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 321, 326 (1972); see also F.A. Hayek,
Communications: The Non Sequitur of the "Dependence Effect," 27 S. ECON. J. 346 (1961) (quoting John
Maynard Keynes), availableat http://www.mises.org/etexts/HayNonseq.pdf (last visited May 23, 2005).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

less than their great economic losses, if paid at all, causing grave hardship; here,
if anywhere, is a situation calling for interpersonal utility comparisons.38
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The following Parts, II-V, are supplied to support the Article's thesis, often
using technical economic modeling terminology and devices.
A. FirstPrinciplesof Settlement Bargainingand the Causes of Litigation
Although our model utilizes standard legal and economic principles currently
in wide use, our approach traces its history through a specific line of economic
and legal theories.
Our model works well with numerous accepted settlement bargaining models.
Chief among these is the George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein divergent
expectations model.39 Priest and Klein noted, understandably enough, that
settlement becomes more likely if the defendant and claimant agree about the
prospective outcome of a trial. 40 The failure to settle primarily owes itself to
disagreement between the claimant and the defendant about a trial's likely
result.4 1 One of the primary causes of disagreement between adverse parties is the
vagueness of the legal decision standard; the more vague the standard, the greater
the uncertainty as to any given case's outcome, and the greater the probability of
litigation. A special cause of disagreement in medical malpractice lawsuits is
uncertainty regarding what caused the injury to the claimant. A trial results when
the claimant's minimum sell price (meaning the claimant's expected judgment
less litigation costs) is greater than the defendant's maximum buy price (meaning
the defendant's expected payout plus litigation costs). 42 Higher litigation costs
can thus encourage settlement by decreasing the minimum sell price and raising
the maximum buy price, thus reducing the divergence between the parties.43
We also incorporate into our analysis the insight of Richard A. Posner that the
size of the range of possible bargaining outcomes influences the likelihood of
settlement. 44 The wider the range of possible bargaining outcomes, the less likely
the parties are to settle.45 Posner showed that claimants and defendants bargain to
divide the costs saved (read "the surplus") from not litigating.4 6 A larger surplus
results in a wider range of possible bargaining outcomes and therefore higher
stakes. 47 A wider bargaining range lessens the likelihood of settlement in part
38. For an indication that pain and suffering damages were historically limited to egregious conduct in
much the way the early offers plan limits them, see generally Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish
Defendants' Paymentfor Pain andSuffering in Return for Payment ofClaimants' Attorneys 'Fees, 1981 U. ILL.
L. REV. 333, 367.
39. See Priest & Klein, supra note 19, at 13.
40. Id. at 15.
41.

Seeid. at 13-15.

42. See id. at 13 ("A sufficient condition for litigation is that the plaintiff's minimum demand (A) exceed
the defendant's maximum bid (B).").
43. See id.
44. See POSNER, supra note 21, § 21.5, at 523.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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because the parties "cannot agree how to divide the available surplus. '48 Posner's
view also implies that a wider range of bargaining possibilities decreases
certainty about the claim's value, because it may be subjected to so many
disparate valuations.
This appears to contradict Priest-Klein, but such is not necessarily the case.
Priest-Klein addresses individuals' reactions to their own costs, 49 while Posner
addresses individuals' reactions to the costs borne by the opposing side. 50 Thus,
Priest-Klein and Posner are discussing two separate forces that are perfectly
explained when the other force is absent, but that, in reality, are constantly at
odds in the lives of claimants and defendants. For illumination's sake, let us look
at the example of a defendant who threatens a claimant with a long, lengthy trial
that will likely deplete the claimant's resources and potentially make even a
judicial victory a monetary loss for the claimant. This defendant is hoping that
the claimant is more of a Priest-Klein individual, who would be more concerned
with his own costs. Such a claimant would likely settle for a much lower price. If
the claimant's motivations are driven more by the Posner effect, he could simply
threaten the defendant with a negative publicity campaign that would impose
great costs on the defendant. Knowing that avoiding those costs would save the
defendant more money and reputation, the claimant's willingness to settle would
decrease, and the minimum settlement acceptable to the claimant would increase.
For the purposes of this research, we assume that the Priest-Klein effect is
dominant, leading to a positive correlation between costs of trial and willingness
to settle. Because of the uncertainty regarding this, however, we do not rely on a
strong positive correlation, but merely on the correlation being positive.
Like Charles J. Goetz,5 we partially attribute the wide range of possible bargaining outcomes in settlement negotiations for personal injury suits to the
common law's prohibition of selling personal injury claims. 2 Goetz demonstrated that a highly competitive market to buy such claims would generate price
information 53 at no cost to claimants. One primary source of uncertainty
regarding trial outcomes is the lack of complete information on the part of the
claimant regarding culpability of the defendant. Claimants rarely have sufficient
education or training to know how much blame, if any, the defendant bears in
their current suffering. A market as defined by Goetz would proxy such
information through market forces. 4 Price information generated by multiple
buyers of claims would closely approximate accurate culpability information
because those with better knowledge would find such a market profitable.55 The
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
51.

See CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 39-43 (1984). On the

subject of selling tort claims, see generally Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral
Hazard, and Attorney Rents, 44 J.L. & EcON. 549 (2001); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal
Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 20 (1991); and Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in PersonalInjury Tort Claims, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987).
52. See GOETZ, supra note 5 1.

53. Id. at 42.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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lack of such a market limits claimants to one set of buyers, defendants, who have
an incentive to reveal only information that benefits themselves. No other buyers
may draw out information about defendants' price range through competitive
bidding.5 6 Goetz's analysis implies that limiting claimants to one set of buyers,
defendants, expands the range of possible bargaining outcomes and decreases
certainty about a claim's value. 7
As noted by Barry Nalebuff, the negotiation process may also be distorted by
the strategic use of settlement demands.5" Claimants seek to appear strong and to
discover information about defendants' reservation price, that is, the highest price
a defendant would pay. In particular, claimants craft their settlement demands to
and to make their threats to sue look credible to
amass "bargaining power
defendants. The need to maintain credibility restricts the range of prices
claimants may demand to sometimes unrealistically high ones.6' If the defendant
rejects a high settlement demand, the claimant has probably learned little about
the strength of the defendant's position, or about the defendant's reservation
price.6 2 But the rejection of a low settlement offer indicates that the defendant is
confident and has a low reservation price.63 By making a high demand, the
claimant avoids appearing weak and also avoids emboldening the defendant.
Unfortunately, the ritual of high demand by claimants and rejection by
defendants does little to help claimants learn about the defendant's reservation
price. Consequently, an "excessive number of cases proceed to court." 64
The Nalebuff model predicts that plaintiffs should win fewer than fifty percent
of cases.65 In contrast, the Priest-Klein theory generally predicts that plaintiffs
should win about half the time.6 6 It is worth noting that plaintiff medical
malpractice win rates in the early nineties were about thirty percent 67 or even
lower.68 Some studies put more current plaintiff win rates at approximately
twenty-five percent,69 while Lester Brickman puts the plaintiff win rate in 2001 at
56. See id. at 39-43; see also Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L.
REv. 383, 386 (1989) ("Prohibiting sales [of matured tort claims] to third parties blocked competitive bidding
and brought the usual abuses associated with monopoly--unequal power, asymmetrical information, and
distorted prices.").
57. See GOETZ, supra note 51, at 41-43.
58. Barry Nalebuff, CrediblePretrialNegotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987). For other asymmetric
information models, see Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of
Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986), and Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of PretrialNegotiation,
59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93 (1992).
59. Nalebuff, supra note 58, at 198 ("For the plaintiff bargaining power depends on the defendant's
believing that he will be taken to court if a settlement is not reached.").
60. Id.
61. Id.at 198-99.
62. Id. at 199.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 208.
66. Id.
67. See Brian Ostrom etal., What Are TortAwards Really Like? The UntoldStory from the State Courts,
14 LAW & POL'Y 77, 83-85 (1992) (noting that plaintiff win rates are about twenty-nine percent).
68. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 50 (1991) (noting that plaintiff win rates are about 18.8%).
69. See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality
Litigation: EmpiricalEvidencefrom Two Datasets,19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 517, 528 (2003).
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about thirty-nine percent in some areas. 70 Obviously, all such figures are well
below fifty percent. Plaintiffs' failure to win half of medical malpractice trials
does not disprove the divergent expectations principle.7' It does imply that the
fifty percent prediction could be distorted by strategic behavior.72
Approaches similar to Nalebuff's have been taken over the years, dealing
primarily with the asymmetric information problems of the physician-patient
relationship. Lucian Bebchuk notes that imperfect information regarding changes
in the potential size of the award, the size of the litigants' costs, and the nature of
the parties' information can affect the likelihood of settlement.73 Unlike
Bebchuk, we allow for a continuum of possible awards with varying
probabilities, allowing greater detail in examining changes in the likelihood of
settlement.74
It is instructive to apply existing models of asymmetric information in
production to medical malpractice litigation. Strategic decisions in medical
malpractice suits may appear very similar to the strategic decisions of competing
producers under imperfect information. In bargaining between firms A and B, A
may, as claimed by Andrew Daughety and Jennifer ReinAanum, actively choose
a disadvantaged position under asymmetric information. This is done through
A's repeated playing of sequential games and through A's practice of sending
signals to B. If firm A waits, it may gain better information regarding the market,
an advantage that may outweigh the loss associated with allowing B to be the
"leader." In the case of medical malpractice, patients and doctors may similarly
act strategically to gain better information about the other party. The physician is
the party with better information regarding true liability to the patient, and tries to
signal lower liability to the patient through a low or no settlement offer. A patient
is the party with better information regarding the extent of the harm, and will
attempt to signal a higher level of harm with higher demands or a high counteroffer. These signals, by transmitting information, may increase settlements by
diminishing the disparity of expectations discussed above if believed. If,
however, the parties believe the signals to be "cheap talk," or exaggerated
versions of true valuations, expectations may diverge further.
Asymmetry of information is seen as a major stumbling block to tort reform
proposals. Any proposal that makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to recover will
simultaneously make the plaintiff more willing to accept an offer but a defendant
less likely to offer. This makes predicting the outcome of reform problematic.
Given the adversarial nature of litigation, there are inevitable obstacles to the
claimant's finding out what the defendant knows and vice versa. Asymmetries
are thus likely to persist. The search for a solution, then, becomes a choice
70. See Brickman, supra note 13, at 716 (citing JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, CURRENT AWARD TRENDS
INPERSONAL INJURY 41 (Catherine Thomas ed., 2002)).
71. See Metzloff, supra note 68, at 64-65.
72. It is worth noting that Priest and Klein assumed, for purposes of their model, "that the parties behave
nonstrategicallywith respect to litigation and settlement." Priest & Klein, supranote 20, at 7 (emphasis added).
73. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 404 (1984).
74. See infra Part [V.A.1.
75. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum, Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in
Role Choice Models: An Endogenously GeneratedSignalingGame, 35 INT'L ECON. REv. 795, 795-97 (1994).
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between attempting to: (a) improve the signals given by each party, or (b) find a
way to bypass a flawed signaling process.
As to (a), the problem is not so much asymmetric information in the signaling
process but (unwelcome as it may sound to economists' ears) highly uncertain,
indeed often unknowable, information given the huge vicissitudes of medical
malpractice litigation. According to a lawyer and physician who together
exhaustively examined malpractice litigation in New York, Colorado, and Utah,
"the legal system is even more prone to error than the medical system it attempts
to judge. 76
As a result, if we choose (b), we choose to largely bypass the signaling
process, alleviating current difficulties by implementing direct incentives on both
parties to settle promptly. Incentives presented to physicians increase the
likelihood of their making the requisite early offers to plaintiffs, and once early
offers have been made, plaintiffs face strong incentives to accept it. By creating
those incentives for each party to settle, the parties' expectations are brought
together. We are thus able to avoid the asymmetric information problem without
having to solve the asymmetry itself, and we can avert the largely futile task of
trying to create better signaling by opposing parties.
B. Technical Predecessors
Like Ariel Rubinstein, we incorporate a fixed discount factor into our expected
payoff-payout models to adjust for the value of time." Rubinstein constructed a
perfect equilibrium bargaining model in which two players successively propose
portions for dividing a "pie" between them non-cooperatively. 78 The Rubinstein
model informs our study of early offers chiefly with its application of a fixed
discount rate to the value of the pie-here an expected damage award-through
time.79
Gyu Ho Wang utilizes a continuous time (integrand) model for expected
return, allowing a probability distribution function for damages.8 ° Our model
utilizes this same integrand form, allowing for a continuous distribution of award
probabilities. We add to that the previously mentioned notion of positive rate of
time preference, as well as the notion of court costs increasing over time. The
primary difference between Wang's model and our model is one of simplicity
and intent. Wang addresses the effect of medical liability on the quality of patient
care. 81 While certainly worthy avenues for discussion, quality-of-care issues are
not the main subject of this article. In other words, given that all the vicissitudes
of current malpractice litigation make it unlikely to deter substandard care, we

76. Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims Under a Variant of

the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 375 (2002) (citing Howard Hiatt & Paul Weiler,
No-FaultMedical Coverage Would Cure Many Ills, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 1999).
77. See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibriumin a BargainingModel, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982).

78. Id. at 98-99.
79. Id. at 99.
80. Gyu Ho Wang, The Incentive to Take Care and the Deterrence of a Nuisance Suit, 15 SEOUL J.

ECON. 55, 57-58 (2002).
81. Id. at 57-58, 73.
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concentrate on making more sense of the litigation process itself to which we
now turn with a still more detailed construction of our economic model.
III. DIAGNOSING THE ILLS OF THE CURRENT TORT SYSTEM:
LITIGATION-INDUCED COSTS AND THE "WEDGE EFFECT"
CREATE WASTE
Needlessly inflated litigation-induced costs distort the tort system. These
litigation-induced costs harm society in numerous ways. First, too many
legitimate potential claimants never receive compensation because these costs
deter them from bringing valid claims. 8 2 Second, defendants pay often artificially
high amounts to settle. 3 Third, the net amount received by claimants from
settlement and from jury awards is often unnecessarily low. 84 Far from keeping
some litigation-induced costs to a minimum, the current system allows these
costs to produce more baleful effects than would exist under an early offers law.
These costs unnecessarily harm not only both parties to every settlement and
trial, but also potential claimants whom the current level of litigation-induced
costs deter from filing a claim in the first place.8 5 Since these costs drive a wedge
between claimants and defendants, we term their deleterious consequences the
"Wedge Effect."
A. Defining "Litigation-InducedCosts"
"Litigation-induced costs" in our model is a broader concept than trial
expenses. Litigation-induced costs, as defined here, have two primary properties.
First, these costs consist of something valuable to one or both of the parties that
must be foregone to pursue a claim-a broad category composed of market and
non-market costs. Second, these costs generally increase over time. What follows
is an expansion on examples covered earlier.86 Examples of litigation-induced
costs discussed previously are as follows:
" Litigation expenses other than lawyers'fees.87 Many claimants' lawyers
pay expert witnesses and other trial expenses, including those incurred in
generating documents for discovery, performing extensive jury research,
and conducting mock trials, out of the judgment or settlement. These
charges increase with time. They reduce the claimant's expected payoff
the longer litigation continues, and may be minimized by early settlement.
Defendants' lawyers incur similar types of litigation costs. Defense
lawyers generally bill these costs directly to the client.
" Lost Beneficial Reliance. A large unknown liability or asset pending (the
82. At the same time, many iatrogenic injuries are minor and are not severe enough to prompt a lawsuit.
See WEILER ET AL., supra note 7, at 79 ("Most disabling injuries are short-term in character, and thus perhaps
reasonably left to the victim's own resources.").
83. See infra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
84. See infra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
85. Cf. WEILER ET AL., supra note 7, at 140 ("In sum, our analysis of malpractice litigation data
demonstrates that the problem is not a litigation surplus, but a litigation deficit."). By this statement, the authors
appear to mean that many injured victims deserved compensation but received none, not that litigation is the
best mechanism for compensating such victims. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. See supratext accompanying notes 22-25.
87. As to lawyers' fees, see infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
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judgment or settlement, or lack thereof) prevents claimants from making
long-term plans related to the resolution of a claim. The same holds true
for insurance company defendants that cannot be confident as to what
claim values to place on their financial reports. Thus, neither claimants nor
defendants can readily allocate resources in anticipation of the future and
both lose the gains from "reliance" on such plans.88 Lost beneficial
reliance increases the longer the parties labor under uncertainty.
" Opportunity Cost of Litigation. When they begin devoting time and
resources to a legal dispute, claimants and defendants forego other
prospects. For instance, medical malpractice claimants' opportunity costs
may include income from foregone investments, consideration of the
defendant's pretrial settlement offers, vacation, time spent with family,
medical rehabilitation, lost wages, and so on. One might expect that
insurance company defendants' opportunity costs primarily consist of
foregone investment income. A corporation, of course, has no "family" to
spend time with in the human sense, but that is not true of the individual
health care providers insured by liability insurance companies. Both
insureds and insurers may indeed have personal opportunity costs
associated with litigation, such as reputation, and may be willing to offer a
settlement to avoid such costs. 89 Foregone opportunities constitute a cost
that, to value the suit accurately, the claimant (defendant) must subtract
from (add to) the expected payoff of the future award. 90 Overall,
opportunity costs generally should increase with time and can be avoided
by early settlement.
" Peace of mind. Litigation especially taxes the emotional well-being of
injured claimants. 9' If the defendant makes a pretrial settlement offer,
claimants have the opportunity to receive something immediately to
compensate for (perhaps otherwise increasing) lost wages and medical
expenses. But if claimants choose to litigate, they undergo an enormously
draining and frustrating fight and the cost must be weighed against any
expected award. Litigating claimants give up the peace of mind that comes
from avoiding further battle. As indicated above, physician defendants in
92
medical malpractice cases also carry a heavy emotional burden.

88. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 1321-22 (discussing the concept of beneficial

reliance).
89. See infra note 92.
90. Whereas marginal opportunity cost may be declining over some time interval, as opportunity costs
become "sunk" (or are lost), total opportunity costs increase with time.
91. [B]oth the plaintiff and defendant suffer the psychological consequences of protracted
litigation. From the perspective of physician defendants, the lawsuit represents a personal
attack on their professional ability and reputation. The time and energy plaintiffs spend
litigating a claim often delays the emotional closure needed to move forward with their lives.
Kelly K. Meadows, Note, Resolving Medical Malpractice Disputes in Massachusetts: Statutory and Judicial
Initiatives in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOc. 165, 167-68 (citing Allen K.
Hutkin, Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Alternatives to Litigation, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 21, 24
(1989/1990)).
92. The emotional cost to doctors in [medical malpractice] litigation is also very high. Nothing
is more humiliating, painful, or embarrassing for a doctor than to be accused of negligently
hurting a patient. A victory in court probably does little to alleviate this emotional pain. The
mere accusation of malpractice can have an adverse effect on a doctor's reputation among
her colleagues and her credibility with the community.
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Moreover, the early offers statute provides defendants with an incentive to
apologize and make information available to claimants and others without
fear of additional tort exposure. Greater information about the causes of an
injury and hearing some defendants apologize may not only increase the
parties' peace of mind, but may also make for more and prompter
communication between health care providers leading to more effective
safety programs.93

B. MeasuringSome Litigation-InducedCosts
Although it is probably impossible at this point to measure precisely and
accurately the broad concept of litigation-induced costs, empirical data indicates
that some measurable components of these concepts already equal the amount
paid to claimants as compensation. A study published in 2000 observed that only
forty cents of every malpractice insurance premium dollar goes to claimants as
compensation, another forty cents "is sWent on litigation," and the remaining
twenty cents goes to insurance overhead. The Congressional Budget Office, in a
recent report on the U.S. tort system, similarly concludes that "[t]he best
available data on the direct costs of tort cases suggest that victims who file claims
receive an average of 46 cents from each direct dollar spent on the system (with
the other 54 cents going to attorneys' fees and insurance expenses)." 95 All other
things equal, cutting back on just these measurable litigation-induced costs would
greatly reduce waste, enhance the efficiency of the tort system, and benefit both
claimants and defendants.
C. GraphicallyModeling the Effects of Litigation-InducedCosts: The Wedge
Effect
This section pursues the "Wedge Effect" and its deleterious consequences for
claimants and defendants. A Wedge Effect, as indicated above, exists when
buyers and sellers in a market must share a cost related to consummating a
transaction. The Wedge is the amount by which the purchase price to the buyer is
raised plus the amount the selling price received by the seller is reduced. The
paradigmatic example is the sales tax on goods. As will be seen below, to the
extent that litigation-based costs cause a Wedge Effect in the market for
resolution of medical malpractice claims, the current system artificially prevents
some welfare-enhancing settlements, reduces the compensation of claimants
unnecessarily, inflates the payout of defendants, and creates a deadweight loss.

Scott Forehand, Note, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate the
Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907, 909 n.9 (1999) (citation
omitted).
93. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
94. Danzon, supra note 8, at 1344, 1369.
95. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER xi (2003).
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1. How an Ideal Market for Settlements Would Operate
To clearly explain the Wedge Effect, this section first presents how an ideal
"market" for resolution of medical malpractice claims would operate. Figure 2
below diagrams that market (bearing in mind that we assume any individual
claim will have one potential buyer, the defendant).
Figure 2: Equilibrium Market for Resolution of Tort Claims

Price

Pequilibrium

0

Q cilfi,

Quantity

Figure 2 illustrates an ideal equilibrium market for resolution of medical
malpractice claims, which are sold at certain prices (vertical axis) and quantities
(horizontal axis). A diagram like Figure 2 could represent (1) a "market" for a
single claim with one buyer and one seller, or (2) a series of pairs of one buyer
and one seller, or (3) one or many sellers.96 Buyers are defendants; sellers of
claims are claimants. Demand curve D represents defendants' buy preferences.
Demand curve D slopes downward because defendant buyers prefer to settle a
larger quantity of claims as they grow cheaper. Supply curve S represents
claimants' sell preferences; it slopes upward because a higher quantity of
claimants prefer to sell their claims as defendants make increasingly generous
settlement offers.
Both curves have some slope, which is determined by price elasticity. We use
the notion of elasticity to measure the sensitivity of the quantity demanded or
supplied to changes in price. We assume that the supply and demand curves are
neither completely elastic nor inelastic, as illustrated in Figure 2.

96. Given the legal restrictions on buying and selling personal injury claims, see supra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text, Figure 2 cannot represent the classical conception of a market in which many buyers and
many sellers compete for the same goods.
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Elasticity is a vital issue in this discussion97 because, as with discussions of tax
burdens, the greater the elasticity of demand (supply), the more the burden falls
on suppliers (consumers). A perfectly elastic demand curve means that the entire
burden falls on suppliers, or in this case, claimants. Economic theory holds that
perfectly elastic or inelastic demand and supply curves are unlikely to exist. Even
vital resources, such as gasoline, or addictive substances, such as heroin, are
likely to have elasticities greater than zero. There are some commodities for
which demand appears to a seller to be perfectly elastic. Markets for these
commodities are often called perfectly competitive markets. In reality, the
demand for such products still exhibits finite elasticity when the market is viewed
as a whole.
In the case of supply, a perfectly inelastic supply curve is illustrated only in
the case of Aggregate Supply models, where the economy has reached its longrun capacity. For an individual market to exhibit a perfectly inelastic supply
curve, it would have to be perfectly regulated by government 98 or every resource
in society would have to be utilized in the production of settlements. A perfectly
elastic supply curve would indicate constant marginal costs. Although it is
hypothetically possible that an underutilized judicial system could, for a time,
increase the number of cases without increases in marginal costs, that trend could
only continue for a limited time, and would rapidly find itself confronted by
increasing marginal costs. Therefore, our assumptions that demand and supply
are neither perfectly elastic nor perfectly inelastic are supported by economic
theory.
The "market" price in Figure 2 to settle any particular malpractice claim is
Pequilibrium, and the quantity of malpractice claims settled by the parties is
Qequilibrium- The plaid area below the demand curve but above Pequilibrium constitutes
the "consumer surplus," or, in terms of medical malpractice claims, the gains to
defendant insurance companies from settling at the equilibrium price. The lightly
shaded area ABC constitutes the "producer surplus," or, in this context, the gains
to claimants from settling at the equilibrium price. In a perfect equilibrium
market such as Figure 2, claimant(s) and defendant(s) have completely captured
and exhausted the gains from settlement(s). All is well.
2. How the Wedge Effect Changes Ideal Market Conditions
Litigation-induced costs alter the Figure 2 "market" by raising the price
defendants must pay to resolve claims. They also divert part of the total price
paid by defendants away from claimants into the pockets of lawyers and others.
Claimants also bear substantial litigation-induced costs, which further diminishes
the amount they receive. Simply put, claimants get less while defendants pay

97. For the foundation for the discussion in the next three paragraphs, see generally JAMES B.
GWARTNEY ET AL., MACROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE (10th ed. 2003); N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS (2d ed, 2001); and JAMES WILLIS, EXPLORATIONS IN MICROECONOMICS
(5th ed., rev. 2002).

98. The use of the word "perfectly" here is not frivolous. In order for a perfectly inelastic supply curve
to exist, the government would not only have to define the maximum number of legal cases but would have to
specifically determine the exact number of cases brought and settled.
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more. The inflated price paid by defendants and the deflated price received by
claimants creates the Wedge. Figure 3 graphically illustrates the Wedge Effect.
Figure 3: The Effect of Litigation-induced Costs on a "Market" for
Resolution of Tort Claims

P equiiriu

Litigation-induced costs, in effect, alter the "market" by placing a barrier
between producers and consumers. 99 This barrier is detrimental in the following
ways.
* First, a shift in the supply curve to the left of the position of Sdefendnt
results in a reduction in the number of settlements. The vertical distance of
any point on the supply curve Splaintiff represents the minimum amount that
claimant must receive to be willing to settle, that is, the amount necessary
to cover costs. It is only above this price that a claim is offered for sale to
the defendant. Litigation-induced costs take a "cut" from the amount paid
by defendants. A higher amount must be extracted from the defendant for
the claimant to receive compensation above costs. This is represented in a
shift of the supply curve to Sdefendt. When the supply curve is thus
restricted, a new equilibrium is reached. This new equilibrium sees a

reduction in the total number of settlements reached,

Qcurrent system.

The

horizontal distance between this point and our Q equilibri is the number of
cases that would have reached resolution without imposition of litigationinduced costs.
* Second, the price of settlement paid by defendants ascends. As noted
above, the defendant must pay a higher price for the claimant to receive
99. In this example, we represent litigation costs in a manner similar to a tax on suppliers (claimants).
We are aware that the burden of litigation costs is divided among claimants and defendants. However, it is
important to note that the result is the same if we assume a tax on consumers (defendants). According to
economic theory, it is the amount of the tax, not the person upon whom it is placed, that determines its effect.
See MANKIW, supra note 97, at 131. Thus, our simplification is appropriate without any loss of general
applicability.
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compensation above costs. As supply is restricted, the equilibrium price
paid by defendants rises. The price for the defendant is now Pdefendant, not
Pequilibrium.

* Third, the price received by claimants declines. Unfortunately, a higher
price paid by defendants does not mean that claimants are receiving a
higher price. Because of litigation-induced costs and the reduction in the
number of cases resolved, using Figure 3 above as a basis of comparison,
claimants see their price received decline from Pequilibrium to Pplaintiff.
* Fourth, the combined litigation-induced costs paid by defendants and
claimants create the Wedge. The Wedge is the vertical distance GH in
Figure 3. The area GFDH represents the potential gains from trade
diverted from the parties to litigation-induced costs. Similar to economic
analysis of taxation, this is a net transfer from consumers (defendants) and
producers (claimants) to the taxing authority (attorneys and others). There
is a reduction in consumer (defendant) and producer (claimant)
surplus
00
associated with this transfer and the creation of the Wedge.1
" Fifth and finally, the Wedge creates triangle FAD-a deadweight loss.
The striped area FAD, formerly split between defendants and claimants as
part of Figure 2, becomes deadweight loss. Every other welfare effect
caused by the Wedge has resulted in net transfers from claimants and
defendants to attorneys and others involved with litigation. It is only
this-the deadweight loss-that shows that society is unambiguously
harmed by the creation of the Wedge. In other words, the deadweight loss
indicates a complete loss of consumer and producer surplus. It is a net loss
to society, and represents defendants who were willing to offer a
settlement and claimants who were willing to accept, but who were
prevented from doing so because litigation-induced costs drove them
apart.
These negative consequences are the result of litigation-induced costs forming
this wedge between consumers and producers. Thus, any reduction in litigation
costs would lessen the harmful effects described above. Reforms should be
judged by how well they shrink the GFDH and FAD areas without generating
new and equally deleterious side effects.' 0 ' With other variables held constant,
reducing the Wedge brings more gains to both claimants and defendants.
Reducing the deadweight loss produces an efficiency gain and thus greater
satisfaction for claimants and defendants.

100. Instead of enjoying the area below the demand curve and above CA, the defendant now receives
only the smaller shaded area below the demand curve and above GF. The claimant similarly loses the larger
area CAB and receives the diminished shaded area HDB.
101. See Danzon, supranote 8, at 1371 ("[A]ny reform that reduces the deadweight costs of litigation and
defensive medicine or improves the efficiency of deterrence or compensation without increasing litigation or
overhead costs would improve the efficiency of the system.").
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IV. THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION-INDUCED COSTS ON CLAIMANTS'
INCENTIVES TO SETTLE OVER TIME
This section introduces a model that puts a value on tort claims. In addition to
valuing claims, this model sheds light on the causes of the Wedge Effect and how
it can be minimized, and explains both the derivation of the supply curves in
Figure 2 and the ambiguous influence of litigation-induced costs on claimants'
inherent incentives to settle.
A. Deriving the Modelfor Claimants:Adjusting FutureNominal Damages
Awards
As noted in discussing Figures 1 and 2 above, our model adjusts the value of
future awards to their net expected present value. Again, the phrase "net expected
present value" bundles together four adjustments to future awards, which account
for (1) probability of payment; (2) time, and specifically a positive rate of time
preference by individual actors; (3) claimant's lawyer's fee; and (4) other
litigation-induced costs. 0 2 Together, these adjustments return (or provide) a
figure for the value of claims; these amounts also create the supply curve in
Figure 2. We hereupon take up items (1)-(4) in greater detail.
1. Adjusting for Probability
Again, as noted in discussing Figures 1 and 2 above, a future nominal jury
award must be adjusted twice for probability: once for the probability that the
jury will find the defendant liable, and again for the probability of various
damage awards. We conflate these two adjustments into one weighted average
probability of a damage verdict. We assume a normal distribution of the possible
damage awards. The weighted average of all possible jury awards returns a single
probability-adjusted payoff that the claimant should expect. This is the claim's
expected value. Let E(p) stand for expected value.
We now turn beyond Example in Part I.E to Example 2. Claimant P believes
that jury J is 50% likely to find liability in a medical malpractice case. If J awards
damages, P believes it will award one of four damage values: $1 million;
$750,000; $500,000; or $250,000. All of these damage awards are equally
probable. In other words, there is a 50 percent probability that P will receive
nothing, and a 12.5% probability of receiving any one of the positive damage
awards. The weighted average verdict, also known as the expected value or E(p),
is $312,500, computed in Table 3 below. Example 2 and Table 3 assume a small
number of discrete possibilities. A more precise method would use a continuous
function. Let function f(v) represent the probability distribution that the jury will
find liability for any alleged tort injury x. Let s(v) represent the probability
distribution of possible jury awards for alleged injury x. Combined, f(v) and s(v)
return the weighted average of all possible damage awards. Our model assumes a
normal distribution of probable damage awards, as illustrated in Figure 4 below:

102. This Article ignores income tax adjustments.
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Table 3: Weighted Average Expected Verdict Under Example 2 Facts

50.0%
12.5%
12.5%
12.5%
12.5%
100.0%

No Award
Award 1
Award 2
Award 3
Award 4
Sum

We ighted
Av erage
(thotisands)

Possible
Nominal
Award
(thousands)

Probability
of Damage
Award

1,000.00
750.00
500.00
250.00

$

125.00

$
$
$

93.75
62.50
31.25

$

312.50

Figure 4: Probability Distribution of All Possible Jury Awards,flv)s(v)
100 T

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Quantity of Money Awarded ($)

We use the standard mathematical notation for a continuous function, an integral
E(p), of
([). This function, f(v)s(v), takes the weighted average expected value,
1 3
0
is:
claim
the
of
value
expected
the
far,
Thus
all possible jury awards.
E(p) = ff(v)s(v)dv
2. Adjusting for the Value of Time
Next, claimants must adjust future expected damage awards for time. A dollar
today is obviously worth more than a dollar tomorrow. This is true because of
103. Notation dv is mathematically required and merely denotes v as the object of the integral.
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two separate factors. The first, of course, is that a dollar today may be invested,
leaving today's dollar worth its face value plus potential investment income. The
second related but somewhat different reason is that individuals have some
positive rate of time preference. In other words, claimants who receive the choice
of obtaining something desirable today or tomorrow will choose to receive it
today, ceteris paribus. The mathematical rate of the time discount is r, and
includes discounts for the investment value of time, as well as individuals'
positive rate of time preference. The total discount depends on the number of
time periods, t. The standard equation for discounting to present value is:

$Amount
(1+ r) t
Let t represent years. The present is t = 0. An award given by a jury three years
from the present will occur in t = 3. A jury award in t = 3 must not only be
discounted according to r, it must also be corrected for annual inflation i, which
offsets the discount factor.
Example 3. Jury J is expected to give $1 million to Claimant P at t = 3, in
future dollars. Let r = 0.05 (5%). Let i = 0.03 (3%). The inflation-adjusted r = r-i
= 0.05 - 0.03 = 0.02 (2%). The value of the $1 million in t = 0 is $942,322.33, as
follows:
$1,000,000
= $942,322.33
3
(1.02)
This equation uses discrete' °4 compounding intervals equal to the value of t.
Increasing the number of discrete compounding intervals-even while using the
same annual discount rate r-adds an additional discount. 0 5 In this article, we
avoid compounding interval issues by using continuous compounding. The
discount rate will be expressed as the base of a natural logarithm e raised to the
power of-r and t, or e- t. Our restated model (2), below, adjusts the expected jury
award to account for the value of time:
(2)

E(p) = e-rtLff(v)s(v)dv

104. "Discrete" means that we use a finite or countable number of compounding periods, rather than
using continuous compounding.
105. For instance, if Example 3 were compounded monthly, r = 0.02/12 = 0.00167, and t = 3 * 12 = 36.
The present value of the Example 3 jury award compounded monthly would equal $941,811.57.
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3. Adjusting for Claimants' Attorneys' Contingent Fees
Claimants' attorneys generally charge a contingent fee of roughly one-third of
the jury awardtl 6 There is evidence indicating that claimants' lawyers may
subtract litigation costs from the award first and then extract their fees. 7 Others
choose to extract their fees first and then subtract litigation costs.'0 8 Our model
can adapt to either situation. We assume the latter."19
Let a represent the portion of the judgment received by claimants. We define a
as being 66.7%, " ° or a E [0.667]. Since claimants pay the contingent fee only
when they receive an award, the fee need not be djusted for probability and
remains outside the integral (that is, to the left of J below in model (3)). The
contingent fee, however, must be paid in the future when the client receives the
award, so it is adjusted for time. The restated model including a is:
(3)

E(p) = e-'[a!f(v)s(v)dv

4. Adjusting for Other Litigation-Induced Costs
The expected value ofiury awards must also be adjusted for litigation-induced
costs, as defined above."' Let c(t) represent these costs. Litigation-induced costs
accrue over time and must be discounted. They also increase over time. Adding
c(t) to the restated equation (4) below renders the model complete:
(4)

E(p) = e-' [a ff(v)s(v)dv

-

c(t)1

B. Litigation-InducedCosts May EitherDiscourage or Encourage Claimant
Settlement
Equation (4) suggests that the expected payoff of a claim inherently
diminishes the longer payoff is delayed. Litigation-induced costs, however, can
106. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
107. See EMILY COURIC, THE TRIAL LAWYERS 124 (1988); see also supra text accompanying note 87.
108. Claimants' lawyers may use a standard contract that entitles them to take their contingent fee "off
the top," that is, before subtracting costs. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP & JEFFREY B. BERMAN, THE STORY OF A
CIVIL CASE: DOMINGUEZ V.SCOTr'S FOOD STORES, INC. (3d ed. 2001).
In consideration of the services to be rendered for me by my said attorney hereunder, I
hereby sell, transfer, assign and convey to my above named attorney or attorneys an
undivided interest of ONE THIRD (1/3) interest in and to said claims and amounts received
in settlement in the event same is or are settled without suit, and FORTY (40%) per cent of
same and of any judgments obtained or amount received, on or for such claims or suits, if
same is or are collected by suit or by settlement after suit is filed.
Id. at 8. When claimants' lawyers take their contingent fee off the top, this obviously increases the risk to
claimants, as a lengthy and expensive trial may even cause them to receive little or no award after the
contingency fee and trial costs have been paid.
109. For the former example, monetary costs of trial can simply be included in the value of a.
110. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
111. See supra Part III.A.
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either contribute to this inherent diminution or mitigate it. Settlementencouraging reforms can avoid this uncertainty by contracting the pretrial and
early settlement bargaining time periods, as an early offers law does. Our
analysis below relies on the following largely uncontroversial assumptions:
1. Increasing net expected costs over time reduces expected payoff, and
encourages claimants to settle at a lower price. Rising costs enlarge the
Wedge and drive down the price received by claimants (see Pplaintiff, Figure
3 above).
2. Increasing the contingency fee decreases a, reduces expected payoff, and,
with such lowered returns for claimants, increases the probability of their
accepting a settlement offer at any given price. A rising contingency fee
also increases the Wedge and drives down the price received by claimants
(see Pplaintiff, Figure 3 above).
3. Skewing the probability distribution function (that is, f(v)s(v)) to the left
(right) in Figure 4 will decrease (increase) the expected payoff, and will
increase (decrease) the probability that claimants will accept a settlement
offer.
1. Marginal Trial Expenses and the "Dissipation Principle"
To discover the change in the expected value of claims over each increment in
time, meaning the marginal gain or loss in expected value from one unit of time
to the next, we find the first derivative of equation (4) above, as shown in
equation (5) below:
(5)

aE(p) = re- a Jf (v)s(v)dv
at

-

[e - rtc(t) - rerc(t)]

x

I

II

Equation (5) returns (or provides) the change in a claim's expected value,
E(p) , over the change in time, at. Term I represents the overall change in the
expected payoff over one unit of time due to all the elements except litigationinduced costs. Term I indicates that claimants' expected payoff diminishes with
each unit of time the award is delayed. Claimants have an inherent incentive to
settle to avoid deductions in expected value owing to delay.
Term II, however, may or may not offset Term I's diminution of expected
payout and its encouragement of settlement. The first item in Term II, e-" c'(t),
represents the discounted value of marginal 1 2 trial expenses. These trial expenses
contribute to claimants' portion of the Wedge (see Figure 3, area CEDH).
Marginal trial expenses are always positive and will always reduce expected
payoff and encourage settlement the same way Term I does.

112. We use the word "marginal" in its economic sense of "each additional" unit viewed individually
(here, trial expenses), not in its colloquial sense of "extremely small."
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But the second item in Term II, - re-rtc(t), represents variables that increase
claimants' expected payoff with succeeding units of time." 3 These are referred to
as 'dissipating opportunity costs." Dissipating opportunity costs exert upward
pressure on the expected value of the claim with each unit of time, and
discourage claimants from settling (more on these incentives in a moment). We
call this the "DissipationPrinciple." To understand the Dissipation Principle,
one must remember that opportunity costs are the value of forgone opportunities
once a choice is made. When such choice is no longer available, meaning a
valuable opportunity has been foregone and has receded into history, it no longer
subtracts from claimants' expected payoff.
The Dissipation Principle thus means that before a claimant foregoes
opportunities to gain income, the value of any prospective income must be
subtracted from the expected value of the future judgment. But after these
opportunities have been given up (that is, "sunk"), they cease to be subtracted
from the expected payoff. Simple examples would include claimants with
lucrative investment opportunities that they can take advantage of in the event of
immediate settlement. The prospect of losing this investment imposes a cost. But
once the choice is made not to settle and the opportunity passes, the prospect of
losing this investment is no longer a cost.
At the onset of a claim, the claimant's opportunities that are exploitable
through early settlement exist and have some value. But as time passes without
settlement, a claimant's opportunities available through early settlement fade into
history, one by one, and each then ceases to be subtracted as a cost from expected
payment. All other variables held constant, as these costs go down, expected
payoff must go up. These foregone income opportunities may include
investments, wages, or non-market valuables such as delayed medical
rehabilitation, time that could be otherwise spent, or peace of mind given up to
pursue litigation.
Example 4 and Figure 5 below present a graphical illustration of the
Dissipation Principle.
Example 4. Claimant P files a medical malpractice claim in t = 0 (let t
represent months for purposes of Example 4). Six months later in t = 6, P begins
sacrificing other opportunities related to income, health, emotional well-being,
and other valuables in preparation for trial in t = 8. P subjectively values these
combined opportunities at $50,000. From t = 6-22, P foregoes almost the total
value (over 98%) of these opportunities as part of preparing for and participating
in the trial. This dissipation in opportunity costs is calculated for purposes of
this example using a rate of 2.6% per month. In t = 36, jury J awards P the
amount anticipated by P, $1 million. Marginal trial expenses are an average of
$3,200 per month from the start of the trial in t = 8 until its conclusion in t = 36,
as in Figure 5.

113. Item -re"c(t) increases the expected payoff of the claim over time despite bearing a negative
sign because the model causes Term I to be subtracted from Term II. Thus, ifa negative value, such as Term I,
is subtracted from another negative value, such as - re-c(t), this is mathematically the same as adding a
positive value to Term I, or increasing expected payoff.
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Figure 5: Total Effect of Dissipating Opportunity Costs and Marginal Trial
Expenses on Example 4's Expected Value (EV)
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Figure 5 illustrates a hypothetical simulation of the Dissipation Principle.
The anticipated judgment is diagrammed twice, once as a dotted line and once as
a solid line. The dotted line is the amount of the anticipated judgment discounted
each month at an annual rate of 2% (a monthly rate of 0.167%, or 2 divided by
12).115 The dotted line has no other adjustments; it is called the "pure discounted
judgment line" and serves as the baseline for assessing the net impact of
litigation-induced costs on the anticipated judgment.
The solid line, called the "cost-adjusted judgment line," adjusts the anticipated
judgment for the effects of litigation-induced costs. The cost-adjusted judgment
line accounts for, first, marginal monthly trial expenses, e-c'(t), and, second,
marginal dissipated opportunity costs, - re-rlc(t). Marginal monthly trial
expenses and the Dissipation Principle work at cross-purposes. The former,
e- c'(t), decreases the anticipated payout of the judgment and causes the costadjusted line to run well below the pure discounted judgment line. The latter,

114. For reasons of simplicity, Figure 5 ignores adjustments for probability in Example 4's anticipated
judgment.
115. Figure 5 assumes that dissipation occurs at an exponential rate sufficient to discount the $50,000 in
opportunities by at least 98% over 16 months (from t = 6-22; the monthly discount rate is r = 0.26). The
Dissipation Principle's most general effect would also exist if opportunity costs dissipate at any other rate. The
rapid nature of dissipation under the assumption of exponential rapidity within a few months allows its clearer
demonstration. Even though the same general effect would exist using many other lower rates of dissipation, it
would be less pronounced. But a dissipation rate that is sufficiently gradual might increase the value of the
claim so slightly that dissipation never dominates marginal trial expenses.
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-re-rtc(t), increases the anticipated payout of the judgment and causes the
cost-adjusted line to approachthe dotted pure discounted line.
In Figure 5, at t = 1, before any opportunity costs have dissipated, the full
value of Example 4's $50,000 in other opportunities is subtracted from the pure
discounted judgment line. This creates a disparity between the cost-adjusted
(solid) line and the pure discounted (dotted) line. Beginning in t = 6 and
continuing through t = 22 (a total of 16 months), however, over 98% of the
opportunity costs dissipate. Consequently, the cost-adjusted line rapidly rises to
approach the pure discountedjudgment line as opportunity costs are "sunk."
The rise of the cost-adjusted line signifies an increase in the value of the claim.
All other things equal, a rational claimant will prefer the expected payoff in t =
10 to the expected payoff in t = 6, so that in t = 6 the increasing value of the
claim due to dissipating opportunity costs discouragessettlement.
2. The Dissipation Principle as Lessening Claimants' Incentives to Settle
The Dissipation Principle may discourage claimant settlement for some period
of time, but only under an extremely narrow set of assumptions, like those in
Example 4. These assumptions are: (1) that the claimant has a substantial reserve
of opportunity costs that (2) can be dissipated at a rapid rate. Tort reformers can
enhance the prospects for settlements by remaining mindful that claimants may
be most susceptible to settlement enhancing measures before they forego
valuable opportunities in preparationfor trial, as will be the case under an early
offers statute.
But regardless of whether the sign of E(p) in equation (5) is negative or
at
positive, the dissipation effect always detracts at least slightly from the
claimant's overall incentive to settle. With other variables held constant, at some
point during trialpreparation or litigation, claimants whose opportunity costs
begin to dissipate also experience some decline in the incentive to settle. If the
Dissipation Principle's effect dominates over Term I's effect for some temporary
period of time, there must be a break-even point when Term I and Term II are of
equal magnitude. Referring back to and restating equation (5), a possible breakeven point can be defined as:
(6)

- re-r a Jf(v)s(v)dv = e-rc'(t) - re-'rc(t)
x

Both sides of the equation contain discount factor e-r. These cancel each other
out and leave a simpler equation, defined as:
(7)

- ra Jf(v)s(v)dv = c'(t) - rc(t)
x

Multiplying both sides of the equation by -1 further simplifies the equation.
The break-even point may be most simply defined as:
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raJf (v)s(v)dv = rc(t) - c'(t)
x

We have labored this point and inserted more equations because we believe
that in some limited circumstances the sign may flip from negative to positive
after a break-even point. In these cases, for some period of time the Dissipation
Principle's effect dominates and discourages settlement.
Empirical studies show that the settlement rate dips and rises during roughly
the time period when dissipation should in theory occur. In these studies, 60.4%
of medical malpractice claims filed with insurance companies result in the filing
of a lawsuit. 1 6 Nearly all of these are closed "after suit but before trial," that is
53.6% of the original pool of claims. Of the remaining 6.8%, only 1.6% of these
claims close during trial, while 3.2% close "at verdict" and 2.0% "are closed on
appeal."" 17 The smallest percentages of claims are closed during roughly the time
this Article predicts the most dissipation: when claimants forego the most
opportunities in preparation for and during litigation. Of course, these statistics
do not "prove" the Dissipation Principle," 8 but they are consistent with it and
therefore provocative.
Complications introduced into the model by the Dissipation Principle arise
after claimants begin serious preparation for litigation. Legal reforms should help
disputants avoid many, if not most, of the complications of litigation-induced
costs by nipping them in the bud. Reforms should encourage settlement while the
claim is still young, as an early offers statute does.
V. DEFENDANTS' INCENTIVES TO SETTLE AND THE OVERALL
EFFECT OF EARLY OFFERS ON THE WEDGE EFFECT
A. The Effect of Litigation-InducedCosts on Defendants'Incentives to Settle over
Time
This section introduces a model that describes defendants' expected payout to
claimants. It demonstrates that defendants have an inherent and dominant
incentive to settle over time. The defendant model closely tracks the claimant
model in equation (4) above:

(9)

E(p) = ert[ f (v)s(v)dv] + fc(s)ds

116. Danzon, supranote 8, at 1358.
117. Id.
118. Danzon attributes these settlement rates to the acquisition of more information by both litigants. See
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But equation (9) modifies equation (4) in two important ways. First, the
function of equation (9) returns a positive number, but to the defendant this
number represents a negative value because defendants are paying. Second, a
(the claimant's lawyer's contingent fee) is removed and does not influence
defendants' payout or incentives. (In terms of Figure 3, the contingent fee is
subsumed under claimants' portion of the Wedge in area CEDH, not under
defendants' portion.) Defense counsel bills hourly as defense costs accrue,
instead of charging contingently. Notation Jc(s)ds is a continuous function
representing defense counsel's average billing rate (and related costs) over time
t. 1 9 Defense counsel's rate adds to the expected payout because both are cash
outflows (negative numbers). We analyze the effect of litigation-induced costs on
defendants under the following uncontroversial assumptions:
1. An increase in defendants' expected costs over time increases defendants'
expected payout and increases their likelihood of offering a settlement at
any given price, as well as increasing the average settlement offer.
2. Skewing equation (9)'s probability distribution function to the left (right)
will decrease (increase) expected payout, and will decrease (increase) the
probability that defendants will offer a settlement, as well as the size of the
settlement offer.
According to equation (9), defendants' trial expenses always increase over
time. The more protracted the dispute period, the more defendants' portion of the
Wedge grows (see Figure 3, area GFEC). With other variables held constant,
defendants' incentive to settle is constant and positive through time. Defendants
should therefore prefer to resolve tort claims as early as possible to minimize the
Wedge.
B. Early Offers Can Reduce the Wedge Effect
The risk-shifting mechanism of early offers, discussed above in the
introduction and summary, 20 shrinks the Wedge and decreases litigation-induced
costs because rational claimants will not go to trial post-early offer. As a result,
more cases will be settled quickly.
Figure 6 below graphically illustrates a21hypothetical reduction in the Wedge
caused by adoption of an early offers law.

119. A simple version of c(s) is a linear function, and it serves to illustrate this example well. However,
c(s) need not be a linear function for the following discussion to be true. Thus, linearity is a sufficient, but not a
necessary, condition. All that is necessary for the following discussion is that c(s) be increasing with time.
Because few defense lawyers offer discounts during any time period while the case is proceeding, we are
confident in the assumption that c(s) is, in fact, increasing with time.
120.

See supra Partl.

121.

The reductions in the Wedge and deadweight loss depend on the elasticity of the demand and supply

curves.
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Figure 6: Effect of An Early Offer on the Wedge Effect in a
"Market" For Resolution of Tort Claims
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Figure 6 hypothetically illustrates six improvements resulting from adoption of
an early offers law:
" First, the claimant supply curve shifts to the right. In Figure 3 above, 122 the
litigation-induced costs caused a shift of the claimant supply curve to the
left. Any reduction in such costs will shift the curve back to the right. In
Figure 6 above, the pre-early-offer defendant supply curve is Spr-EO.
Following the early offer, the curve shifts to a position not unlike that of
SEO.

* Second, the Wedge shrinks, and costs cut by this shrinkage expand the
consumer (defendant) and producer (claimant) surpluses.123 Before an
early offer, the Wedge took up area EFIH in Figure 6. After an early offer,
the Wedge decreases to area DBCG. Areas EFKD and GJIH are no longer
part of the Wedge, while the smaller area BKJC is added to it. (The actual
size of these areas depends on the elasticity of supply and demand. 124)
" Third, the overall price paid by defendants to settle drops in Figure 6 from
Pdl (the pre-early-offer price) to Pd2 (the post-early-offer price). The drop
in price applies to all claims currently bought by defendants. This
generates savings on every such claim.
" Fourth, defendants will settle a larger number of claims, relative to the
elasticity of demand, at the lower price. 25 The quantity of claims
122. See supra note 99.

123. Of note is the fact that reductions in the Wedge are potential reductions in wages to attorneys.
However, similar to analysis of taxation, reduction in the vertical size of the Wedge does not always result in a
reduction in the total area of the Wedge. Under certain circumstances, the total area of the Wedge may actually
increase, increasing compensation to attorneys, in addition to adding to consumer and producer surplus. In
every event, however, a reduction in litigation costs is beneficial to claimants, defendants, and society as a
whole.
124. See supra text accompanying note 97.
125. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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voluntarily purchased by defendants will increase in Figure 6 from QprC-EO
to QEO. This does not mean that defendants will likely pay more overall;
the increase in claims submitted to any given defendant will likely be too
small to offset the savings on all current claims. The types of new claims
that will be brought are either those worth so little that the old system's
costs deterred claimants from filing them, or those that should have settled
in the old system but went to trial instead due to litigation-induced costs.
Furthermore, because defendants are not required to make offers, the
quantity increase is entirely voluntary and
26 cannot cause defendants to pay
out more overall unless they choose to.'
" Fifth, the overall price received by claimants climbs from PpI to Pp2.
Although claimants face a lower expected payoff, the total value received
by the average claimant arguably will increase. Granted, the expected
payoff to claimants under tort law includes the possibility of higher valued
awards, yet evidence shows that such awards are received by a small
portion of claimants.127 Tort law also includes potentially substantial costs
that under statutory early offers are not exacted because further litigation
has been averted. Finally, and to repeat, in total compensation terms, the
dramatic reduction in risk to the claimant due to a guaranteed payoff is
itself valuable as compensation.
" Sixth, the deadweight loss shrinks. The Figure 6 area FBCI is taken out of
the deadweight loss and split between the consumer (defendant) and
producer (claimant) surpluses, on the one hand, and the Wedge on the
other. Area FBK becomes part of the new consumer surplus, while the
producer surplus is expanded by area JCI. As noted, the Wedge is
increased by the area KBCJ. As the deadweight loss shrinks, claimants
formerly prevented from settling in the pre-early-offer system by
litigation-induced costs achieve settlements without inflating defendants'
overall costs.
An early offers law, thus, would seem to make both defendants and claimants
better off overall by saving litigation-induced costs and increasing the number of
welfare-enhancing settlements.
At this point, the reader is asked, before moving on to Part VI, to recall-and
perhaps reread for emphasis-Sections I.C-E above. They, especially the text
accompanying Examples 1 and 2 along with Figure 1, best illustrate with readily
accessible exemplars the case for early offers reform, now reinforced for the
reader by the rest of Section I and the more technical material in Parts II-V
dealing with this crucial issue of lessening of Wedge.

126. See supra notes 10, 85 and accompanying text.
127. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 95, at 8 (observing that less than six percent of all state tort
cases result in a damage award greater than one million dollars). For example, Lester Brickman observed in
1992 that in asbestos lawsuits "a small percentage of the unimpaired-perhaps 10-20/--will hit the asbestos
lottery and be awarded $100,000 or more." Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need
for an AdministrativeAlternative?, 13 CARDOZo L. REv. 1819, 1873 n.231 (1992).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35

VI. AN EARLY OFFERS STATUTE WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN
OTHER PROPOSED REFORMS IN REDUCING THE WEDGE EFFECT
AND ENHANCING THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS FOR
CLAIMANTS AND DEFENDANTS
If the senior author's proposal of an early offers law can reduce the Wedge
Effect and avoid the Dissipation Principle through statutorily defined offers that
encourage settlement,128 it meets one of Patricia Danzon's key economic criterion
that is, whether it is likely to reduce the
for evaluating a proposed reform,
129
deadweight loss of litigation.
We turn now to prominent tort reform proposals including damage caps,
changes in the collateral source rule, and regulation of claimants' attorney
contingent fees. Our model strongly suggests that these other tort reform
measures lack an early offers law's ability to structure and encourage pretrial
settlement. They either fail to reduce the Wedge Effect or reduce it less than
statutory early offers. These proposals also do little or nothing, unlike an early
offers statute, to steer clear of the Dissipation Principle's effect, which can
temporarily muddle claimants' inherent incentive to settle.
A. Problems with Competing Tort Reform Proposals .
The theme running through tort reforms competing with early offers is not so
much improvement of the tort mechanism, but cutting costs regardless of the fact
that injured patients will thereby be hurt. Early offers are superior to reforms
such as damage caps, changes in the collateral source rule, and restrictions on
lawyers' contingent fees because, unlike such reforms, statutory early offers
settlement process and the compensation mechanism of
improve both the pretrial
30
the current system.1
1. Damage Caps and Changes in Collateral Source Recovery
Early offers laws incorporate concepts from damage caps reforms and
limitations on the collateral source rule. Like these reforms, early offers laws
benefit defendants by restricting noneconomic damage awards and by
eliminating repayment of claimants' already-insured losses. Although our model
implies that damage caps and restrictions on the collateral source rule may
encourage earlier settlement and reduce the Wedge Effect, as do early offers,
they do so solely at claimants' expense.1 32 In contrast, the early offers plan would
128. See supraPart V.B.
129. Danzon, supranote 8, at 1371.
130. We forego at this point the implications of statutory early offers for cases with multiple defendants
and the issue of joint several liability. We do urge, however, that limitations on joint and several liability, like
other tort reform proposals discussed herein, solely advantage defendants and correspondingly disadvantage
plaintiffs.
131. Our model does not take into account the effects on it in states that have already enacted these
reforms.
132. For a dramatic presentation of the deleterious effects of such limitations in cases of severe injury, see
Rachel Zimmerman & Joseph T. Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers Turn Away Some Cases,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004.
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almost certainly result in much greater reductions in both the time to settlement
and the Wedge Effect as well as offering claimants something valuable in return
for their assent: prompt payment of essential losses and thereby greatly reduced
risk.
Roughly half of the states have reformed their tort systems by enacting
ceilings on possible noneconomic or even total damage awards. 133 These caps
34
have generally limited noneconomic damages to a figure at or near $250,000,
which still allows a significant amount of such damages. Limiting noneconomic
or total damages clearly shifts the probability distribution function to the left (that
is, lessening the amount) in cases where a jury might award an amount in excess
of the cap. Empirical studies have confirmed this effect of damage caps; caps
reduce the "severity" of claims by nineteen to thirty-nine percent, s3 with payout
per claim reduced by up to forty percent, even though these caps, unlike early
offers, "directly constrain only a small percentage of cases."'36 Reductions in
payment under changes in the collateral source rule similarly shift the function to
the left and effectively serve as a "cap" to the extent that defendants are exposed
to lesser payment. This leftward shift of the damages function thus lessens the
expected payout of defendants (and their insurers), while of course reducing the
expected payoff to claimants (and their lawyers).
Any shrinking of expected payoff should make claimants more likely to settle
at any given price. On the other hand, because defendants' payout has lessened,
they grow less willing to settle at any given price; thus their settlement offers
grow smaller with damage caps and changes in the collateral source rule.
Specifically, applying Priest-Klein principles would at first blush seem to
indicate that the result of such changes is uncertain, as the minimum sell price
will decrease, but so will the maximum buy price. 137 Decreasing the number of
possible damage awards, however, also decreases the variance of the probability
distribution function.' 38 In other words, there should be a spike in the probability
the
of the statutorily limited award similar to, but much less pronounced than,
39
spike in Figure 1 above, representing the effect of a statutory early offer.'
As the variance of higher awards decreases in the case of damage caps and
collateral source deduction, parties should more easily agree on which damage
awards are most probable (particularly awards that are highly likely to reach the
statutory or effective "cap"). The Priest-Klein model implies that, inasmuch as
damage caps or changes in the collateral source rule cause parties to agree on the
likely outcome of the case (in this instance the quantity of damages), they will
grow more likely to settle.' 4 A decrease in variance of damages awards should
increase certainty and agreement about claims' expected value (especially claims
133. Danzon, supra note 8, at 1355-56, 1372.
134. For example, California and Texas (two of the most populous states) have capped noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases at $250,000. See Zimmerman & Hallinan, supra note 133; see also CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997)); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 2005).
135. Danzon, supra note 8, at 1356.
136. Id. at 1372.
137. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text accompanying note 17.
139. See supratext accompanying note 17.
140. For an explanation of the Priest-Klein model, see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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with high noneconomic damages), and facilitate earlier settlement. One recent
empirical study finds that "[c]apping noneconomic damages.. .reduces settlement
time by 35 .9%.,,141 Restricting the
42 collateral source rule would reasonably be
expected to have similar effects.
Thus, as stated earlier, damage caps and changes in the collateral source rule
share some of the beneficial effects of statutory early offers and, all other
variables held constant, reduce the Wedge Effect just as early offers statutes
effectively "cap" damages and eliminate collateral source recovery. Nevertheless,
statutory early offers are superior to either of these reforms standing alone (or
together) because early offers are not one-sided. Claimants receive in return
reduced risk plus prompt payment. Settlement thus will be much quicker under
an early offers plan. Rather than causing a reduction in the current multi-year
process of settlement by 35.9%, as in the case of damage caps, 43 statutory early
offers cases will settle in a matter of months. Early offers must be tendered
within 180 days, and claimants generally should have little reason to delay
acceptance. Similarly, however much collateral source rule changes or damage
caps reduce the variance of expected awards, they cannot reduce it as much as
the binding payment of net economic loss under the early offers plan. Thus, early
offers result in much greater reductions in the Wedge Effect than the above
reforms.
2. Restrictions on Claimants' Attorneys' Contingent Fees
Restricting claimants' lawyers' contingent fees should also reduce the Wedge
Effect by the amount claimants' lawyers lose as a result of contingent fee control.
But significant costs unrelated to the contingent fee, such as the delay in payment
to claimants and other trial expenses, remain undiminished within the Wedge.
Empirical studies show that only reductions in statutes of limitations, damage
caps, and offsetting collateral sources have any effect. Contingent fee reforms of
the type enacted, it seems, have no effect.' 44
In addition to, at best, a minimal reduction in the Wedge, contingent fee
restrictions lengthen the time to settlement. 45 Such restrictions most likely
decrease claimants' incentives to settle at any given price by increasing their
expected payoff (variable a in equations (3) and (4) above grows with any
restriction on the contingent fee). Defendants' expected payout, on the other
hand, does not include a. In other words, as claimants grow less willing to settle
at any given price, defendants are no more willing to increase their payout. The
net effect of these diverging incentives will be an overall decrease in the
141. Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 69, at 537.
142. See Danzon, supra note 8, at 1374 ("Empirical evidence confirms that collateral source offset rules
have not only reduced claim severity but also claim frequency, consistent with the prediction that lower awards
reduce the incentive to file."). Danzon does not go so far as to say that collateral source offset rules reduce the
time to settlement.
143. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
144. See DANZON, supra note 8, at 1356. But for a different contingent fee reform with a quid pro quo,
see Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contingency Fee Reform, 44
EMORY L.J. 173 (1995).

145. See generally Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 69.
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likelihood of early pretrial settlement and a higher percentage of claims that
result in delayed settlement or even trials. One empirical study has found,
consistent with our model, that when claimants' lawyers' contingent fees are
limited, the time to settlement increases by eleven to twenty-one percent.146
Restricting contingent fees may also reduce the number of cases brought by
reducing lawyers' incentives to take cases.1 47 Even though lawyers may file
fewer claims in the first place, it is unclear whether restricted contingent fees will
actually result in fewer trials, given the new mix of cases. But the reduction in
claims filed due to contingent fee caps may fall just as heavily on legitimate tort
claims as on less valid ones. Restrictions on contingent fees seem to focus more
on the abuses of lawyers than on unintended consequences of such restrictions
for injured patients. Other than punishing claimants' lawyers, they appear to offer
little if anything in reducing the Wedge Effect or accelerating compensation for
legitimate tort claimants.
VII. CONCLUSION
The early offers plan has many of the same positive effects as damage caps,
restrictions on contingent fees, and limits on collateral source recovery, but with
this crucial difference: any advantage of such reforms for defendants must be
paid for by them through prompt compensation for claimants' essential losses. In
closing, we are emboldened to argue that the early offers plan as described and
modeled above furnishes one of those exceedingly rare opportunities to improve
an unfortunate situation (here medical malpractice litigation) with no increaseand indeed it would seem a decrease-in dollar costs.

146. See id. at 519-20 (noting that, when contingent fees are restricted or banned, lawyers switch to
hourly pricing); id. at 536-37 (observing that hourly billable pricing of lawyers increases the time to settlement
and that the "time to settlement is 21% longer in cases that are contingency fee limited"); id. at 538 (observing
that, in using Florida time-series data, "[s]ettlement times increased by 11.1% in the 13 months after
contingency fees were limited compared to the previous 10 months").
147. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 95, at 30 (noting that just limiting on contingent fees "could
hurt other [tort] victims by reducing their access to legal representation").

